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Building a Political Constituency for Urban School Reform 
Abstract 
 
In this article, I argue that urban school reform falters, in part, because of the lack of an 
organized political constituency among the stakeholders with the most direct interest in 
school improvement, that is, parents whose children attend urban schools. I examine 
community organizing as a potential strategy to build such a constituency. Drawing 
primarily upon extensive fieldwork research, I construct a case study of one of the 
country’s largest community organizing networks, the Texas Industrial Areas 
Foundation. I analyze the network’s Alliance Schools initiative to promote school reform 
in one hundred and twenty public schools in districts across the state. I find that 
organizing efforts like the IAF, despite important limitations, are beginning to create an 
external force for change in district policy as well as to collaborate internally with 
educators to produce change in the practice of education within schools.     Page 3 
Building a Political Constituency for Urban School Reform 
 
Despite great attention to reforming schools in urban districts, significant progress 
has been slow to come (Payne, 2008). Test scores have risen in some categories, but it 
remains unclear how much of this increase reflects real learning (Koretz, 2008). 
Meanwhile, the crisis of urban schooling continues with devastating consequences. Some 
recent studies suggest that as many as half of all black and Latino students fail to 
graduate high school on time (Orfield, Losen, Wald, & Swanson, 2004).  
In communities where parents are well organized and politically influential, such 
poor performance would not likely be maintained. Yet parents in urban communities 
often do not have the political clout to effect change (Henig, Hula, Orr, & Pedelescleaux, 
1999). Community organizing, meanwhile, has emerged as an important set of efforts 
that work to engage and build such a constituency among the stakeholders with the most 
direct interest in school improvement, that is, parents whose children attend schools in 
low-income communities (Warren, 2005). Perhaps as many as five hundred community 
organizing groups now work to reform public education in low-income communities 
across the country, and the field appears to be rapidly growing (Gold, Simon, & Brown, 
2002b; Mediratta & Fruchter, 2001; Warren, 2010). 
In this article, I argue that urban school reform falters, in part, because of the lack 
of an organized political constituency that demands change and holds school systems 
accountable for progress. I suggest that strong and sustained progress in school reform 
may require moving beyond “the four walls of schools” to engage the participation of 
parents and residents of low-income communities directly in the reform process. I then     Page 4 
turn to an examination of efforts by community organizing groups to build such a 
constituency and to make an impact on urban school reform.  
 
The challenges to urban school reform 
Scholars have offered a number of explanations for the failure of urban schools to 
make and sustain real improvement. First of all, urban school reform tends to be episodic: 
urban districts adopt a host of rapid reforms that are seldom sustained, a process 
Frederick Hess (1999) aptly described as “spinning wheels.” Before one reform has time 
to take hold, the district moves on to the next reform du jour (Farkas, 1992). In a sense, 
then, district leaders conduct symbolic politics, giving the impression of responding to 
problems and creating change, but failing to carry through. Clarence Stone and his 
associates (C. N. Stone, Henig, Jones, & Pierannunzi, 2001) have argued for the need to 
build civic alliances that can help create reform initiatives and hold districts accountable 
to sustaining their implementation. It turns out that these alliances themselves are 
difficult to organize. Stone, however, notes that even the stronger alliances typically 
exhibit very weak participation from parents and community-based groups in low-income 
communities (see also Henig et al., 1999). 
Secondly, urban school reform efforts tend to be superficial. Richard Elmore 
argues that since public schools are loosely coupled systems, change typically occurs at 
the surface level while the core processes of teaching and learning remain largely 
unaffected. Even when model practices are identified at one school, they are seldom 
transferred to others (Elmore, 2000). Once again, urban schools appear to respond to 
public concern by adopting change initiatives, but they are neither deep nor sustained. In     Page 5 
response, some scholars have called for a sharp focus on instructional leadership (Elmore, 
2000) that is more collaborative (Spillane, 2006) and focused on performance using data 
(Boudett, City, & Murnane, 2005). However, in these approaches, the reform processes 
and their actors remain solidly within the school system and therefore may still lack 
sufficient incentive to make and sustain change. 
Reform initiatives that remain solely within the school may falter because urban 
schools are weak institutions marred by internal distrust, especially along racial lines 
(Henig et al., 1999; Payne, 2008). The best-laid plans typically run afoul of divisive 
school politics as factions fight each other within schools. Even if a school lacks 
organized factions, teachers can become so atomized and isolated in their classrooms that 
they lack the ability to cooperate towards shared ends. Lacking a cooperative spirit and 
trusting relationships in the school community, reform plans falter. In fact, Bryk and 
Schneider (2002) have shown that schools with strong and trusting relationships have 
greater capacity to genuinely embrace and effectively implement reform initiatives. A 
recent study of the 144 inner city public elementary schools in Chicago identified as low-
achieving in 1990 that substantially increased their reading test scores, typically to the 
national average for the Iowa Reading Test, found that “the most consistent feature of 
these schools is that all adults work as a team to improve education, including the 
teachers, parents, Local School Council, principal and community agencies” (Designs for 
Change, 2005, p. ii). Most reform efforts, however, lack such collaboration with 
organized parents and communities. 
Fourth, some scholars have argued that racism directly undermines reform efforts. 
Theresa Perry (2003), for example, argues that schools as dominant institutions operate     Page 6 
on the basis of the assumption of black intellectual inferiority. In other words, educators 
hold racial stereotypes about their low-income students of color. They have low 
expectations of these students and misinterpret cultural behavior. A school can adopt an 
improved educational practice, but if teachers fail to believe their low-income students of 
color can learn and achieve at high levels, their core teaching practice will not change 
(Oakes & Rogers, 2005). According to Oakes and Rogers, the only way to challenge and 
eventually change deeply held cultural beliefs is through the mobilization of marginalized 
groups in a social movement. 
A fifth view describes low-income families with children, particularly in high 
poverty urban neighborhoods, as a “captured population” (Noguera, 1996, p. 198). 
Because parents have no real choice but to send their children to local schools, there is 
little incentive for urban schools to change. Teachers will receive their paychecks even if 
the school fails to perform well year after year. Accountability through elected school 
boards appears weak, and that has led to the more recent drive for mayoral control (Henig 
& Rich, 2004). NCLB and testing regimes are meant to create an external system of 
accountability for these schools. But, given the growing teacher shortage, especially in 
our most troubled schools, most educators remain secure in their jobs despite continued 
school failure. Given the weaknesses in the internal capacity of urban schools discussed 
above, it remains unclear how externally-based test accountability will create real and 
sustained improvements in teaching and learning (Elmore, 2004). 
Finally, “within the four walls” school reform may be inadequate because the 
problems of urban schools lie embedded in system of structural inequality based upon 
race and poverty. In other words, urban schools often serve communities that are poor,     Page 7 
segregated, and disempowered. The lack of resources and internal dysfunction of urban 
schooling is directly tied to post-war urban decline (Anyon, 1997). Put bluntly, what 
sense does it make to try to reform urban schools while the communities surrounding 
them continue to decline (Warren, 2005)?  Small, incremental improvements in schools 
will do little to alter the individual life chances of inner city students; real gains are more 
likely through collective mobilization (Schutz, 2006). In other words, traditional school 
reform ignores issues of power. In this view, changing schools must be linked to efforts 
to change broader social structures, which requires political mobilization to connect 
schools to community revitalization at the local level (Warren, 2005) and government 
policy at the national level (Anyon, 2005). 
Taking the analysis presented above together, it appears that urban school reform 
falters, in part, due to a lack of political will. Since urban schools operate in captured 
populations who lack the resources to pursue alternatives (Noguera, 2003), they often get 
away with symbolic efforts that create the impression of change. Urban schools lack a 
political constituency of those most affected, parents with children in schools, who can 
demand real improvement and hold public schools accountable for results over a 
sustained period of time. In this context, community organizing represents an important 
strategy to build such a constituency (Rogers, 2006). 
However, the analysis presented above also suggests that external demands, even 
ones made by an organized political constituency, may prove limited if they fail to 
increase the capacity of schools to change. Organizing efforts, then, must find a way to 
connect with schools so that change reaches into core processes of teaching and learning. 
In other words, a political constituency of parents has to become directly engaged within     Page 8 
schools to help build social capital that can increase the capacity of schools to improve 
(Warren, 2005). In addition, when inside the school, an engaged group of parents and 
community members can build face-to-face relationships with school-based educators to 
more directly hold them accountable for improvement (Mediratta & Fruchter, 2003). 
Building such a political constituency is not easy. Low-income parents typically 
work long hours and find themselves beset by a range of challenges that make engaging 
them in political action difficult, from finding adequate housing and health care to 
dealing with drugs and violence in their neighborhoods. Low-income parents, however, 
are not uniquely disengaged: direct participation in organized civic and political action 
has declined across the board in America (Putnam, 2000). But low-income communities 
lack the resources of their more affluent counterparts and exhibit greater needs. 
Nevertheless, the main problem may not lie in the individual, passive parent but rather in 
the lack of opportunity for participation. As Theda Skocpol (2003) has shown, the civic 
landscape is now skewed towards advocacy organizations that speak for people, rather 
than involve them directly in civic and political life. Most organizations either provide 
services to, or advocate for, low-income families; few serve as vehicles for their active 
participation. The result is a widening inequality in political participation (Schlozman, 
Page, Verba, & Fiorina, 2005) and the increasing power of elites in public policy 
(Hacker, Mettler, & Pinderhughes, 2005). 
Before turning to community organizing, we might consider two better known 
approaches to engaging the broader public in urban communities. Advocates of family-
school-community partnerships have argued for an inclusive approach to education, 
where school-based educators involve parents and collaborate with community agencies     Page 9 
(Cibulka & Kritek, 1996; Epstein et al., 2002). Although this approach focuses on service 
delivery, for example in the form of full-service community schools (Dryfoos, 2002), 
many partnerships do recognize the value of connecting teachers with parents and 
involving parents in their children’s education (Henderson, Mapp, Johnson, & Davies, 
2007; Warren, 2005). Community organizing shares some features in common with 
partnerships, and organizing efforts often result in improved programming. Nevertheless, 
most partnerships represent efforts to get parents to support the school’s agenda (Warren, 
Hong, Rubin, & Uy, 2009); seldom do they take a political approach to school reform, 
engaging parents as leaders and collaborators in transforming schools and holding 
systems accountable for change.  
Advocates of civic alliances and collaboratives for systemic change do take a 
more political approach. They argue that long-term and sustainable school reform 
requires building a civic and political base amongst a variety of actors and organizations 
in an urban district (C. N. Stone et al., 2001). These alliances and collaborative typically 
work in alliance with school district administrations to both contribute to and help sustain 
systemic reform initiatives like the development of small schools or small learning 
communities. In some cases Local Education Funds and philanthropic organizations take 
the lead (Useem, 1999). In others, the business community or local universities gain more 
prominence. Again, a community organizing approach shares some overlap with 
collaboratives. In fact, organizing groups sometimes participate in, or even lead alliances 
for reform as we will see later. Meanwhile, some collaboratives make more serious 
efforts to engage people at the grassroots level. But the typical collaborative is a rather 
top-heavy affair made up of elite institutions advocating “for” students and families. In     Page 10 
fact, in their study of civic alliances Clarence Stone and his associates (2001) found 
nearly all these collaboratives lacked the organized participation of the people with the 
strongest self-interest in urban school reform, that is, parents from low-income 
communities whose children attend the district’s schools. Jeff Henig and his associates 
(1999, p. 189) also found lacking a broad community and parent-based movement in the 
eleven urban districts they studied, calling this critical absence “the dog that hasn’t 
barked.” 
 
Data and Methods 
  In the rest of the article, I draw upon my extensive fieldwork research conducted 
on the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) organizing network in Texas between 1993 and 
2003. I supplement this data with published accounts of organizing efforts in New York 
City and elsewhere. In my research in Texas, and as is typical in case study research 
(Merriam, 1998; Yin, 2003), I employed a combination of data collection methods, 
including interviews, participant observation and document analysis. I conducted one 
hundred and fifty-one interviews for this study, including participants in the IAF network, 
actors who have experience with the network, as well as independent observers.
1 These 
semi-structured interviews were designed to reveal organizing processes and outcomes 
from multiple perspectives. 
I conducted observations at a wide variety of IAF activities, including leadership 
training sessions, meetings of staff organizers, action team meetings, larger public 
assemblies, direct action events, and organizational leadership meetings. These were 
designed to see organizing in action, to better understand the role of various kinds of     Page 11 
participants (e.g. leaders and organizers) and to observe the dynamics in the relationships 
between various stakeholders (volunteer leaders, paid organizers, allies and the targets of 
the IAF’s actions). Detailed field notes were taken. I observed seventy meetings in all. 
Finally, I collected and examined a variety of documents. Internal IAF 
publications (newsletters, leaflets, and budget reports) provided further information about 
the network’s practices. Newspaper articles provided information about the public 
activities of the network. 
I analyzed the interview material, observational field notes and documents using 
categories derived from analysis of school reform sketched above as well as those that 
arose inductively from the data. In order to increase the accuracy of the analysis, data 
sources were “triangulated” by checking wherever possible what people said in 
interviews against what was observed and what was stated in published accounts. To 
strengthen the validity of the findings, I looked intentionally for discrepant data (e.g., by 
interviewing observers who were independent of the IAF and sometimes critical of the 
network) and alternative interpretations for emerging patterns in the analysis (Maxwell, 
1996).   
In the next section I present an historical overview of community organizing 
efforts at school reform. Then, after discussing some published accounts of other 
education organizing efforts in New York City, I present an analytical case narrative of 
the Texas IAF constructed from the data I collected. A more extensive analysis of the 
network can be found in Warren (2001). Due to space limitations, and as is typical in case 
study presentations, I have not cited the data sources (interviews and observations) for all     Page 12 
of the specifics in the case history recounted here. These sources are available from the 
author upon request. 
 
The Turn of Community Organizing to Education Reform 
Community organizing has long distinguished itself by focusing on cultivating 
participation and leadership by grassroots people in civic participation and political 
action. Rather than advocating for people, organizing groups seek to engage people 
directly to work for change in their schools and communities. Organizing groups find 
their roots in several American movements, from settlement houses to the civil rights and 
women’s movements (Fisher, 1994). However, they draw most explicitly from the 
community organizing tradition developed by Saul Alinsky in Chicago in the thirties 
(Alinsky, 1971; Horwitt, 1989). Alinsky sought to work with institutions that structured 
community life, like religious congregations, to build leadership and power for working 
class people. At the same time as C IO unions were organizing workers in industry, 
Alinsky sought to create organizations through which working people could act to create 
change in their neighborhoods. 
Alinsky’s organizing tradition went through many changes over the years and 
spawned a variety of styles (Reitzes & Reitzes, 1987), but its core focus on participation 
and leadership, if anything, strengthened (Warren, 2001). Moreover, the civil rights 
movement contributed a new appreciation for the power of faith and of grassroots local 
action (Morris, 1984; Payne, 1995). As the movements of the sixties declined, organizing 
groups came to concentrate their work mainly on issues of housing, economic 
development and neighborhood safety, but seldom schooling. In the nineties, however, in     Page 13 
recognition of the increasing importance of success in schools to children’s life chances, 
organizing groups began to turn their attention to the crisis in public education in their 
communities (Warren, 2005). In other words, they have sought to bring to bear their 
skills in political constituency-building to school reform. Recent research suggests that 
community organizing groups working for education reform number over two hundred 
(Gold et al., 2002b; Mediratta & Fruchter, 2001), with a recent estimate putting the figure 
at five hundred (Warren, 2010). 
 
Education Organizing in New York 
Initially many organizing groups took the approach of marshalling their base to 
build the political will to get institutions to meet community demands.  This approach 
followed standard organizing practice as had been applied to community development 
issues. In other words, most organizing groups had honed their skills in efforts to get city 
housing authorities to enforce codes, to get banks to end redlining and lend in inner city 
neighborhoods, and to get a variety of services improved (Briggs & Mueller, 1997). This 
strategy represents a “unilateral” approach to power, where power is understood to be the 
force to get others to do your bidding (Warren, 2005). 
This “power over” approach can create the political will for change in public 
education. For example, New Settlement Apartments (NSA), a community development 
corporation, had organized around a variety of housing and neighborhood issues in the 
South Bronx, a community made infamous as a symbol of urban decline. By the early 
1990s it could claim many accomplishments, providing housing for nearly 900 families, 
and opening playgrounds and community programs. But, according to Eric Zachary and     Page 14 
shoal olatoya (2001), who have studied NSA’s education work closely, NSA affiliated 
parents began to complain more and more about the struggles their children were having 
in District 9 schools, perhaps the worst performing in the entire city.
2 In 1995 NSA 
formed a Parent Action Committee (PAC) which chose to focus its efforts on PS 64, the 
local elementary school. The group partnered with the Community Involvement Program 
at NYU’s Institute for Education and Social Policy, which had been supporting education 
organizing efforts for several years. Program staff brought needed expertise on education 
issues and in organizing to NSA parents. A turning point came when parents learned that 
only 17% of students at PS 64 read at grade level. PAC sought to meet with the principal 
to discuss what was being done to improve education at the school. They found to their 
surprise that the principal did not know these statistics but defended the school anyway. 
He showed no sense of urgency and refused to meet again with PAC, telling them to get 
involved with the parent association at the school. In response to this rebuff, PAC 
gathered 1,100 signatures demanding the removal of the principal and organized a 
number of protest actions. After three years of organizing, the principal was removed and 
a new principal more open to school change and collaboration with PAC was hired. 
Tragically, however necessary this campaign proved to be, all of the civic energy 
expended by the group had no immediate impact on improving education at the school.  
Another example from New York City shows the possibility for organizing efforts 
to create the political will for policy change and to hold school systems accountable for 
sustained change. New York ACORN, the local chapter of the national ACORN 
community organizing network, had been involved in a variety of education efforts in the 
early nineties working predominantly with black and Latino families in some of New     Page 15 
York’s poorest neighborhoods. According to Elaine Simon, Marcine Pickron-Davis and 
Chris Brown (2002), who have studied the network closely, these parents had 
consistently complained about discriminatory treatment they felt their children faced in 
the schools.
3 Following the model of audit studies to demonstrate housing discrimination 
(Yinger, 2001), ACORN organized black and white parents to visit schools to ask for 
information about gifted and talented programs. Many of the group’s minority parent 
“testers” had trouble getting past security guards to reach the school office to ask for 
information. In the end, black testers saw educators half as often as white parents who 
received school tours two and a half times as often as the black parents did. ACORN 
issued their Secret Apartheid report in 1996 detailing their findings (ACORN, 1996), and 
the group proceeded to organize protests on racial discrimination. As a result, then 
Chancellor Rudy Crew drafted new standards for admission to gifted programs and the 
Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights issued a consent decree to reduce 
discrimination in informing parents about gifted programs. 
ACORN, however, proceeded to monitor the district’s practice, finding little real 
improvement or enforcement of the agreement. The group continued to demand action 
and moved forward with the next phase of its campaign, issuing Secret Apartheid II  
(ACORN, 1997). This report showed that the coursework offered at a majority of the 
middle schools serving black and Latino students did not prepare them to take the 
entrance exams to the city’s selective high schools. After ACORN mobilized parents to a 
series of actions, Crew eventually agreed to direct $8 million in funding to provide 2,000 
students with access to the district’s Math and Science Institute that would prepare them 
for the selective exams. By leveraging its neighborhood-based social capital, ACORN     Page 16 
had succeeded in winning some important reforms to the system, which, although only 
partially implemented, opened up greater opportunities for children of color. 
  These are important accomplishments to be sure, but organizing groups realized 
over time that they were not directly affecting the core of teaching and learning at failing 
schools. As a result, many groups in the field have turned towards a more collaborative 
approach to change processes within the school. They have not necessarily abandoned 
their independent stance or their ability to leverage “unilateral power.” But they have 
added to that approach a greater emphasis on collaboration, an understanding of 
“relational power” (Warren, 2005), also referred to as a social reproduction model of 
power (C. Stone, Doherty, Jones, & Ross, 1999). 
  For example, beginning in 2000, New Settlement Apartments and the Bronx 
chapter of ACORN worked with four other community organizations and the Community 
Involvement Program at NYU to form the Community Coalition for District 9 (CC9). 
According to Michael Fabricant (2010), who has studied the coalition closely, the groups 
decided that, in order to deeply affect school practice, they needed to combine their 
diverse bases to create greater influence.
4 CC9 targeted three interrelated issues: 
improved teacher quality, stronger school leadership, and the creation of school-
community partnerships. In order to focus their efforts, the CC9 groups launched a 
campaign to provide greater support and mentoring of new teachers. Teacher turnover in 
District 9 was so high that only about half of teachers in the district’s schools had been 
there more than two years; less than half had five years of teaching experience. In pursuit 
of this campaign, CC9 followed a twin strategy. CC9 organizers leveraged the groups’ 
bases of parent leaders from their neighborhood work to influence district policy. They     Page 17 
also partnered directly with ten district schools whose principals were open to a greater 
role for community collaboration and parent voice in the schools. 
   During this period, New York’s mayor took control of the school system and a 
new team of Department of Education (DOE) regional superintendents replaced many 
who had been hostile to community participation. In addition, CC9 reached out to the 
UFT teacher’s union, which had become relatively isolated in its contract negotiations at 
the time. CC9 offered support to the UFT in exchange for its willingness to join a 
partnership to develop the new lead teacher program. The program was designed to offer 
incentives for experienced teachers to come to District 9 schools to become lead teachers; 
they would receive $10,000 in additional pay and 50% release time to mentor new 
teachers. Such mentoring would improve the quality of teaching by new teachers and the 
support they received would make it more likely that they would stay on at the school, 
reducing turnover. 
CC9 developed a core of parent leaders to lead the campaign. It did so through a 
variety of trainings designed to build parents’ understanding of the education policy 
issues at hand and their ability to carry out a complex organizing campaign. This 
campaign combined sustained private negotiations with the UFT and the DOE to gain 
their agreement, along with a large public petitioning effort. By the spring of 2004, CC9 
had gathered 10,000 signatures and delivered them to the DOE. Meanwhile, CC9 kept up 
pressure through letter-writing and strategically organized rallies at DOE headquarters. 
By the summer of 2004, the DOE and UFT both agreed to adopt the program and victory 
was declared. Although it is still early, there is some indication that teacher retention has     Page 18 
already begun to increase at District 9 schools, and test scores have risen strongly at the 
ten schools with whom CC9 directly partners (Fabricant, 2010). 
 
The Texas IAF and Alliance Schools
5 
  Probably the most ambitious effort to build a political constituency to change the 
culture of public schooling comes from the Texas Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) and 
its Alliance Schools initiative. The Texas IAF is the direct inheritor of Alinsky’s 
tradition, as Alinsky himself formed the IAF in the 1940s. Yet its approach has grown 
and developed through the leadership of Alinsky-trained Ernesto Cortes and his 
colleagues who have emphasized stronger relationship-building, more systematic 
leadership development among members, and a priority on institutional membership in 
religious congregations (Warren, 2001). While the CC9 campaign directed organizing 
more centrally towards improving teaching in schools, the Texas IAF’s effort was even 
bolder. It took organizing itself directly into schools through the Alliance Schools 
initiative. 
By the late 1980s, the IAF network in Texas had grown from its flagship 
organization COPS in San Antonio to include a dozen affiliates across the state, in 
Austin, Fort Worth, Houston, the Rio Grande Valley, and El Paso with start-ups in 
Dallas, Beaumont, and Eagle Pass.
6 Local organizations won funds for infrastructure 
improvements, affordable housing, and new services in their neighborhoods. The state 
network cut its teeth winning historic campaigns to bring water and sewer services to 
colonias (unincorporated areas along the Mexican border) and provide health care for 
indigent workers. As they improved infrastructure and some services in their     Page 19 
communities, IAF organizers and leaders increasingly sought to address more difficult 
issues, ones that could not be solved solely by an infusion of funds. Institutional reform 
was often necessary, and this task required a longer-term involvement by IAF affiliates 
and more complex processes of confrontation and collaboration. Education reform arose 
at the cutting edge of this realization. 
In one of the earliest forays of a community organizing group into education 
work, the network participated in the Texas school funding equalization and reform effort 
led by Ross Perot in the mid-eighties (Lavine, 1997). During this effort the IAF came to 
see greater funding as a necessary, but not sufficient, strategy for improving schools. In 
the IAF’s view, the causes of school failure went beyond low funding levels and 
demanded a program of broader institutional reform that needed to be addressed school 
by school. This strategy fit well with the IAF’s institutional approach. The network had 
been used to working with member congregations to lead internal organizing efforts to 
strengthen those institutions as they became engaged in organizing efforts. But, of course, 
schools were public, not private organizations. Never before had the Texas IAF attempted 
to reform a public institution so deeply entrenched, and in their view so deeply flawed. 
School reform would require a long-term, sustained effort. With the official founding of 
the Texas IAF network in 1990, Cortes saw an opportunity for a statewide initiative in 
which every affiliate could participate and benefit; this effort became known as the 
Alliance Schools. 
From modest beginnings in the late 1980s, the network’s Alliance Schools 
initiative grew to include over 120 schools across the state, making it the single largest 
school reform experiment in the country based upon parent and community engagement.     Page 20 
Meanwhile, IAF sister organizations in the network spread the model across the 
Southwest and Southern California. The Alliance Schools initiative has several 
distinguishing features. Schools in the alliance become institutional members of the local 
IAF organization. They collaborate with member congregations and receive the services 
of IAF organizers to help them strengthen their internal capacity for educating children; 
the schools also receive additional state funds for staff and program development. At the 
same time, the schools become involved in other issue campaigns of the IAF 
organizations, so that their participants (teachers, principals, parents, and other adults in 
the school community) become trained and engaged as political leaders in the broader 
community. In this process, IAF organizers and local leaders explicitly seek to engage the 
democratic traditions of American education (Dewey, 1938 [1916]) and activate them for 
the current realities of low-income communities. 
The beginnings of the Alliance Schools initiative can be found in the work of the 
IAF’s affiliate in Fort Worth, Allied Communities of Tarrant (ACT). African American 
leaders in ACT had long been concerned with the failure of many black youth in Fort 
Worth district schools. Individual meetings with church members and house meetings 
with groups of neighborhood residents had consistently raised the issue of poor academic 
performance and high drop out rates among African American youth. In 1985 Reverend 
Nehemiah Davis began to talk with other African American ministers in ACT about the 
possibilities of addressing what they increasingly saw as a crisis in their community. The 
black ministers asked ACT’s lead organizer at the time, Sr. Mignonne Konecny, to 
accompany them to meet with business leaders and school officials in the city to see what 
kind of role ACT might play in revitalizing schools.      Page 21 
  Meanwhile, in the summer of 1985, the school district appointed a new principal, 
Odessa Ravin, to Morningside Middle School. Morningside was a predominantly black 
inner city school located in an area from which most of ACT’s black churches drew 
members. Eight-five percent of Morningside students qualified for free or reduced-price 
lunches. More than half came from single parent families. Morningside students were 
scoring last among all Fort Worth Independent School District middle schools on tests of 
educational achievement. Half of the students had failed the writing component of the 
Texas Educational Assessment of Minimum Skills (TEAMS) test.
7 
  Ravin had taught at Morningside many years earlier. As its new principal, she was 
committed to turning the school around. In fact, she had begun visiting churches herself 
looking for community support for the school.
8 But Ravin faced a daunting challenge 
trying to rebuild such a dysfunctional school. On the night before the new school year 
began in the fall of 1985, the school’s office was firebombed. Ravin spent her first year at 
Morningside attending to one crisis after another with little opportunity to begin radical 
changes. 
  In 1986 Reverend Davis and organizer Konecny began meeting with principal 
Ravin and they agreed to work together. The Morningside campaign began without a 
preset reform agenda. Instead, ACT followed the IAF relational organizing strategy of 
individual meetings to begin the process of building relationships that could lead to 
action. ACT leaders, along with some Morningside teachers, set out to visit the home of 
every parent with a child at the school. Through these discussions, ACT leaders sought to 
determine the needs and concerns of parents and to identify those most interested in     Page 22 
participating. The stated goal was to get every parent involved in the education of their 
child. 
  The meetings identified an important obstacle to parental involvement. Many 
parents reported feeling isolated from each other and impotent in dealing with the school 
administration. In response, ACT organized a series of meetings involving fifty to one 
hundred parents during the first school year. The meetings provided an opportunity for 
parents to discuss their relationship to the school. According to Davis: 
At the meetings, we had facilitators and we trained them. Their role is to 
keep a dialog going, not to answer questions, to get parents talking to each 
other. Teachers and principals sit in to listen....We let people vent anger 
and frustration.  That’s necessary for healing to take place.  After some 
time, they calm down on the inside and can be constructive.  Then the 
facilitator lists problems and solutions, all from the parents....At the next 
meeting, the angry parents are often the conciliators.  In between time, we 
try to get them to visit the school.  Most parents don’t go to school until 
they’re angry.  This time their experience is more positive and, at the next 
meeting, they’re positive.
9 
  As parents became more positive and empowered, they began to identify specific 
needs, some of which concerned issues outside of the school. ACT’s first campaign 
involved closing a store that sold alcohol to underage students down the street from 
Morningside. As parents and school personnel gained confidence and organizing 
capacity, they turned their attention more directly to educational issues. ACT responded 
by developing training programs on such issues as how to help a child with homework.     Page 23 
Consistent parental concerns expressed about unsupervised children during after-school 
hours led ACT to help parents establish a free after-school program at Morningside 
featuring sports, arts and academic tutoring. African American churches in ACT 
developed their own programs, like parent and child recognition ceremonies, to support 
the school campaign. 
  The parent organizing effort at Morningside began to demonstrate immediate 
success. Seven hundred parents attended the fall back-to-school open house after ACT’s 
first year of organizing. Only forty or so parents had ever shown up previously. Within 
two years, student scores on the TEAMS achievement test had risen from last among all 
middle schools in Fort Worth to third place. In 1990, Morningside received the Texas 
Governor’s Excellence Award, and was one of four schools in Texas to win the Carnegie 
Initiative Award from the Texas Education Agency.
10 
  Inspired by the early successes of the ACT effort, Cortes encouraged other Texas 
IAF affiliates to experiment with school reform efforts. Meanwhile, economic and 
political developments in the late 1980s helped create a greater opening for a major state 
initiative by the IAF. First, the oil crisis of the 1980s had sent Texas into a long and deep 
recession, exacerbated by the savings and loan crisis. Although Texas always had pockets 
of poverty, the poor were easily overlooked during the period of rapid economic growth 
in the 1970s. Many assumed poverty was solely the problem of rural Mexican 
immigrants. Once the recession set in, however, unemployment and poverty grew. 
Moreover, large Texas cities began to experience a concentration of poverty in their inner 
cities that devastated communities (Kasarda, 1994). Crime, school failure, and drug abuse 
emerged as public issues of concern in the state.     Page 24 
  In 1990, Democrat Ann Richards was elected governor of Texas. Richards had 
already worked closely with the IAF on the colonias issue when she was State Treasurer. 
Since the Democratic Party itself had a weak organized base in Texas communities, the 
IAF represented a powerful ally that could support the broader goals of her 
administration. After her election, Richards appointed former COPS co-chair Sonia 
Hernandez as the director of education policy in her office. She appointed the reform-
minded Lionel “Skip” Meno to head the Texas Education Association (TEA), the state’s 
department of education. 
  With Meno’s support, IAF leaders lobbied the legislature to pass a pilot Alliance 
Schools program in 1992, modeled in part on its work at Morningside. The initial 
Alliance Schools program provided $10,000 in TEA funding to each of twenty-one 
schools involved in local IAF efforts. Principals who joined the effort could use the funds 
to support teaching training and curricular development in their schools. The bill also 
provided for special waivers so that local schools could by-pass some regulations and 
establish innovative reforms more quickly. For its part, the IAF would provide 
professional organizers to engage parents and the broader community in transforming 
schools and increasing student achievement. It would also take organizing right into 
schools, working directly with principals and teachers who would become organizational 
leaders along with parents and community residents. Alliance Schools joined their local 
IAF organization and emerging school leaders became part of the organization’s 
leadership team. 
  The Texas IAF proceeded to make an organizational commitment to the Alliance 
Schools far exceeding anything in its past. Cortes lobbied private foundations for the     Page 25 
funds to hire new organizers for the local school efforts. Although the lead organizers for 
local affiliates were prepared to supervise and train school organizers, the effort could not 
succeed without the new staff. Impressed with the network’s work at Morningside 
Middle School and elsewhere, the Rockefeller Foundation granted the funds needed to 
hire education coordinators over a five-year period beginning in 1990.
11 
  The new organizers, education coordinators as they were called, went to work, 
using the IAF’s relational organizing strategy to engage parents and other residents of 
neighborhoods surrounding the Alliance schools. The more successful campaigns drew 
upon the base already established in local churches as experienced IAF leaders from 
congregations near the local schools helped engage parents and school staff. The IAF 
built school campaigns not around issues identified a priori by school reform experts, but 
rather out of the concerns and interests of local parents. At the Zavala School in a 
Hispanic neighborhood in Austin, the first campaign sought to establish a health clinic at 
the elementary school. Some efforts focused on school safety. Meanwhile, school 
principals used the extra Alliance funds to help teachers develop innovative curricula to 
reform the structure of schooling. In the predominantly black Roosevelt High School in 
Dallas, for example, the principal implemented a block-scheduling program.  
Through the Alliance Schools, principals, teachers as well as parents all become 
potential political leaders in Texas IAF organizations and are trained to collaborate with 
each other. The network uses its strategy of relational meetings, where leaders share their 
values and concerns in one-to-one focused conversations with each other, to strengthen 
understanding and trust. This brings parents into active roles in schools, but also brings 
teachers and principals into action around community concerns, whether the sale of     Page 26 
alcohol to school children in Fort Worth or later efforts to develop a job training program 
in Austin. 
  While local school organizing gave the effort solid roots, the IAF also worked to 
develop a multi-level collaborative approach to deepen and expand the reform work. The 
IAF convened a series of statewide leaders meetings on education. Hundreds of local 
leaders attended a series of meetings in which they read studies and heard presentations 
from school reform experts. The network drafted a document entitled “The Texas IAF 
Vision for Public Schools: Communities of Learners” that framed their emerging work. 
Although professional staff hired by the Texas IAF helped develop the document, teams 
of local leaders wrote the actual text. Calling for flexibility and experimentation, the 
document does not commit the network to apply one single strategy for every school but 
rather hopes to “inspire a thousand strategies.” Nevertheless, the network places itself 
squarely in the camp of progressive educational innovation, criticizing the mass 
production model of schooling and calling instead for schools to become communities of 
learners. According the document (Texas Interfaith Education Fund, 1990, p. 10): 
In our vision, the model of a school shifts from efficiency to effectiveness: 
from that of students as passive learners to that of a community whose 
members are committed to learning the skills of problem-solving, teaching 
themselves and others, and collaboration. 
Cortes and the IAF began to talk about the need to build a relational culture in schools as 
a foundation for any significant progress.   
Meanwhile, IAF organizers and leaders spent time reading John Dewey and his 
modern interpreters. Dewey (1915; 1938 [1916]; 1991 [1927]) saw education as a     Page 27 
democratic project, a critical institution for progressive social change. Schools in his view 
should be community institutions with multiple connections between learning and 
community action. IAF organizers and leaders appreciated Dewey’s educational 
philosophy and agreed with his vision for a participatory civic culture as vital to 
American culture more broadly. The IAF’s self-education effort proved serious and 
sustained, providing a basis for engaging school personnel around an educational vision 
deeply rooted in American schooling, even if that vision has languished in the recent 
period. 
  The IAF network sponsored large statewide conferences involving up to one 
thousand parents, teachers and principals from its local school efforts to hear talks by 
leading scholars and education activists like Howard Gardner, Ted Sizer and James 
Comer. The IAF sent local organizers and leaders to training programs every summer at 
James Comer’s center for school reform at Yale University; later they went to Project 
Zero, the Harvard University program directed by Howard Gardner. These outside 
resources and connections gave legitimacy to local leaders and school personnel 
struggling to overcome the resistance of district administrators. It also broadened and 
deepened their perspective on school reform, stimulating new ideas and strengthening 
programmatic initiatives. 
  The Alliance Schools program, for example, helped a new ACT organizer, 
Leonora Friend, and principal Ravin begin a second round of organizing to expand and 
deepen reform efforts at Morningside Middle School. Ravin admitted that Morningside’s 
early gains in test scores had come through an emphasis on drilling and memorization. 
When the school started administering a more difficult test of achievement, the state’s     Page 28 
TASS test, the school’s scores were once again below the state average. Ravin drew from 
the discussions at Alliance School seminars to move instruction towards developing 
higher order thinking and problem-solving skills among students.
12 Meanwhile, Friend 
organized parents to get more involved in instructional issues in the school, to begin to 
share responsibility with school personnel for the education of their children.
13  
  Dennis Shirley (1997) has examined the results of the Alliance School efforts in 
its first few years. Of the relatively small number of Alliance Schools in existence long 
enough to assess, the elementary schools demonstrated noticeable gains in standardized 
test scores, while the middle and high schools demonstrated no clear gains as a group 
compared to other similar schools. But it may be unrealistic to expect immediate gains to 
be made through complicated collaborative processes. Moreover, as Shirley (1997, p. 
220) argues, “...a host of teachers, parents, administrators, and community leaders credit 
the Alliance School network with revitalizing their schools and neighborhoods, and test 
scores hardly provide a comprehensive measure for assessing cognitive development or 
community improvement.” In fact, the measurable improvements in educational 
outcomes appear less impressive than the transformation in the culture and practice of 
schooling created by the Alliance initiative. 
  The success of the IAF’s relational strategy in involving thousands of parents 
across the state, coupled with some improvements in test scores at Alliance schools, 
made the Alliance Schools popular and the Texas IAF more respected among state 
politicians and educators. Meanwhile, the participation of nationally recognized 
educators strengthened the legitimacy of the reform effort. Each succeeding legislative 
session approved an expansion of the Alliance Schools program so that by 1996 it     Page 29 
covered over 100 schools, providing $50,000 in special funding to each one. In 1999, the 
legislature approved yet another expansion of the program, increasing funding from $8 to 
$14 million, and allowing each school to receive up to $100,000 in extra funding. 
 
Discussion 
I have been concerned in this article to examine community organizing as a 
process to build a political constituency capable of addressing the weaknesses in urban 
school reform. My analysis of these weaknesses suggested the need for organized 
communities to follow a twin strategy. They need to work “externally” to demand change 
and hold systems accountable as well as to work “internally” to collaborate with 
educators to strengthen the internal capacity of schools to improve.
14 My analysis of the 
New York City cases also serves to suggest the necessity of a twin strategy; moreover, it 
shows that some groups have proved capable of using such a strategy to accomplish 
significant reform in one large section of a very large and politically complex district. 
The Texas IAF case suggests a twin strategy can be taken both to a larger scale (across 
many districts) and more deeply into schools as well.  
Beyond the Texas and NYC cases, there is growing evidence that other 
community organizing groups have begun to experiment with building political 
constituencies capable both of operating in the political environment around schools, to 
push for change and hold systems accountable to sustain reform, and also of operating to 
impact the internal workings of individual schools (Gold et al., 2002b; Mediratta et al., 
2009). For example, the Logan Square Neighborhood Association organizes parents in 
eight elementary and middle schools in its Northwest side Chicago neighborhood.     Page 30 
Among other reforms, the group piloted a Grow Your Own Teacher program that offers 
free college education leading to bilingual certification to neighborhood parents who 
commit to taking positions in these schools (Blanc, Brown, Nevarez-La Torre, & Brown, 
2002; Warren, 2005). Chicago ACORN along with LSNA and other groups organized to 
get the Illinois state legislature to fund an expansion of the pilot to community 
organizations across the state (Mediratta et al., 2009). Meanwhile, the Oakland 
Communities Organization spearheaded an effort that got Oakland Unified School 
District to open forty-eight small schools across the city, helped plan the design of the 
schools, and now partners with those schools to increase school-community collaboration 
(Gold, Simon, & Brown, 2002a; Snyder, 2008). Many other organizing groups around the 
county have tried a variety of approaches in this combined direction, that is, both inside 
and outside of schools (Mediratta, 2004; Mediratta & Fruchter, 2001). 
  The study of community organizing efforts at urban school reform is a relatively 
new field. This close examination of one case in Texas, along with examples from New 
York and other districts, is highly suggestive of the possibilities for organizing to 
represent an effective strategy for reform. But much more research needs to be done to 
examine the field and its outcomes. One recent study (Mediratta et al., 2009) showed that 
organizing efforts can impact student achievement when taken to a sufficient scale in a 
favorable environment. But we do not know how many organizing groups have had such 
impact. 
Moreover, we need more comparative research to determine what kinds of 
organizing strategies prove effective in what kinds of contexts. We also need to consider     Page 31 
the internal capacities organizing groups require to undertake this work (Gold et al., 
2002b). The cases discussed here, however, suggest some beginning hypotheses. 
 
Context 
  In both Texas and NYC, the ability of organizing groups to collaborate with 
school systems required a willingness on the part of educators to partner with them. In 
both cases, the opening began with a change in administration, whether at the state level 
in Texas, the district level in NYC, or the school level at Morningside Middle School in 
Fort Worth. Community organizing groups, as we saw in both NYC and Texas, often 
begin to mobilize parents by emphasizing the poor education children are receiving, 
using test scores often as evidence. This approach may antagonize current school leaders. 
One can imagine situations where established educational leaders prove willing to 
collaborate. However, new leaders do not have to take responsibility for past problems or 
current failures, and that may be why they are more likely to partner. Moreover, new 
leaders may prove more open to the ideas and initiatives of community organizing groups 
as they are typically looking to develop their own new initiatives at the beginning of a 
term. Established leaders may have their own reform agenda, and resent the intrusion of 
what they may see as non-expert “outsiders” (Cutler, 2000; Fine, 1993). 
  Pinpointing the kinds of context conducive to organizing is difficult. In fact, the 
reverse of the pattern just described is also possible. In other words, a new leader can halt 
a reform initiative that the previous leader established with an organizing group. The 
community organizing group PACT worked to get the Miami-Dade County Public 
Schools to adopt direct instruction in a set of schools with which PACT partnered. When     Page 32 
Rudy Crew took over as district superintendent, he ended the initiative. The organizing 
efforts of PACT did not prove sufficient to save the program.
15 
  The context for organizing efforts is complex and can change over time. The 
demand to raise test scores has put tremendous pressure on district officials and 
principals and that can work against collaboration with organizing groups. The rise of 
high stakes testing regimes in many Texas school districts has threatened to cut off the 
room for experimentation necessary for organizing efforts at the school level. Even the 
Texas IAF, one of the strongest organizing networks, has struggled to maintain 
momentum in this new environment (Shirley & Evans, 2007). Of course, implementation 
of testing regimes varies by state and locality. Texas is home to some of the harshest 
implementation, where some district officials give principals a set number of years to 
raise test scores and threaten them with dismissal if they fail. In such a climate, creating 
the space for portfolio assessment, as tried by the Austin IAF affiliate for example, has 
fallen on deaf ears in school administration. 
 
  Internal Capacity 
  A twin strategy of outside demand and inside collaboration requires that 
community organizing groups develop a certain degree of internal capacity. They need 
the financial resources to pay a sufficient number of professional organizers, expert 
knowledge to engage in policy development, and a broad enough organizational reach to 
affect district policy (Gold et al., 2002b; Mediratta et al., 2009). New, small or isolated 
groups typically lack these kinds of capacity. So it is likely that the larger and more well-
established organizing groups will be the ones to undertake education reform at this level.     Page 33 
  Even so, organizing groups appear to use different strategies and arrangements to 
build this capacity. In Texas, the IAF had a broad organizational reach within its network. 
Its local affiliates operated district-wide and were connected across the state. In NYC, the 
smaller, independent groups solved the problem by working together in the CC9 
coalition. The Texas IAF proved able to build expert knowledge internally by bringing in 
experts to consult with and train local leaders. The CC9 coalition took a slightly different 
course. It formed a partnership with the Community Involvement Program then at NYU, 
which provided expert knowledge for the reform effort. 
Both the Texas IAF and the CC9 coalition had to raise significant funds from 
private foundations to hire organizers to pursue education reform. In contrast to the high 
demand for capacity required, we must realize that the resources generally available for 
education organizing are low. These funds come from a combination of member dues and 
private foundations; they appear meager in comparison to the undertaking at hand. One 
survey found that the median annual budget of faith-based organizing groups, which are 
of a size typical of the broader field, is only about $150,000 (Warren & Wood, 2001). 
Some larger groups do have more sizeable budgets, up to a million dollars annually (Gold 
et al., 2002b); but even for these larger groups education work represents just one part of 
that budget. Groups typically have only a few organizers devoted to education 
organizing.  
  The community organizing field is also highly fragmented. Its strength lies in its 
local base and sometimes in its state level reach. But there are few networks that operate 
at the national level. Some networks have begun to experiment with national level work 
on healthcare reform, but not around education issues (Whitman, 2006; Wood, 2007).     Page 34 
Locally based collaborations across organizations are becoming a bit more common as in 
the South Bronx and Chicago cases. But they still remain rare as groups compete with 
each other for turf. The number of intermediaries like the Community Involvement 
Program at the Annenberg Institute (formerly at NYU) is growing, but still remains 
small. In the vast majority of cities, community organizing groups lack connections to 
partners who can readily provide expertise. 
 
Conclusion 
Probably the biggest challenge organizing groups face lies in finding a way to 
influence deeply the core processes of teaching and learning at the school level over a 
sustained period of time. Collaborations between organizing groups and educators appear 
important to influence education in that way; and these collaborations require a favorable 
context of willing educators and organizing groups with relatively high internal capacity. 
The Grow Your Own Teacher program in Chicago and the teacher leadership program in 
the Bronx show the potential to begin to impact core processes of teaching; both 
represent collaborations involving a number of organizing groups. The Texas IAF 
represents an even more ambitious effort to take organizing right into the institution of 
the school, and it has the weight of one of the largest and most sophisticated networks 
behind it. The work seems promising, but it is unclear how deep and broad internal 
reform will go and how long it can be sustained. 
The IAF recognizes that it cannot be the job of community organizers and parents 
directly to transform instruction; that remains the province of professional educators. 
What organizing can do is help generate an internal consensus and will to improve on the     Page 35 
part of educators. Organizing also can help build trust and social capital throughout the 
whole school community to expand the capacity of schools to change (Bryk & Schneider, 
2002). In addition organizing can increase face-to-face relational accountability in the 
school (Mediratta & Fruchter, 2003). These relationships can begin to change stereotypes 
between teachers and families (Warren et al., 2009), and they can offer a more immediate 
accountability for school improvement to an organized and educated parent force in the 
school (Rogers, 2006). If organizing succeeds in this way, it should contribute to 
improved teaching and learning. Indeed,  there is some evidence that the most 
sophisticated and large-scale organizing efforts like those of the IAF have begun to 
impact student achievement (Mediratta et al., 2009). 
The challenges facing urban school reform are great. Community organizing does 
not represent a “silver bullet” to solve these problems alone. But, particularly when they 
ally with other reform agents, organizing groups have begun to show the potential to 
organize a political constituency to build the political will for change, to contribute to 
increasing the capacity of schools to change and to hold systems accountable to improve 
the education provided to children in our urban communities. 
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